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Abstract This paper will provide support for relationalism; the claim that the
identity of objects is constituted by the totality of their relations to other things in the
world. I will consider how Kit Fine’s criticisms of essentialism within modal logic
not only highlight the inability of modal logic to account for essential properties but
also arouse suspicion surrounding the possibility of nonrelational properties. I will
claim that Fine’s criticisms, together with concerns surrounding Hempel’s paradox,
show that it is not possible to provide a satisfactory account of certain properties in
abstraction from their place within a wider context. Next, we will shift attention to
natural kinds and consider the notion that relevance plays in metaphysical accounts
of identity, by examining Peter Geach’s notion of relative identity. I will argue that
the intensional relation between subject and object must be included in a satisfactory
account of metaphysical identity.
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The aim of this paper will be to provide support for a form of ontological holism that fills
the vacuum in analytic philosophy, namely the “relationality thesis.” Versions of this
thesis can be found in the early work of Heidegger,1 and throughout the work of
Richard Rorty. For the purposes of this essay, we will take the relationality thesis to be
the claim that the identity of objects is constituted by the totality of their relations to
other things in the world. Due to its insistence that identity is constituted by all of the
relations an object shares with the world, this thesis can be understood to be holistic.
I will provide support for this thesis by arguing that the notion of nonrelational
properties is fundamentally incoherent, thereby providing a criticism of the doctrine of
essentialism. The metaphysical consequences of such a theory are not to be
Int Ontology Metaphysics (2011) 12:19–30
DOI 10.1007/s12133-011-0074-6
1See Weberman n. d. and Rorty 1999.
M. Young (*)
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
e-mail: Mark.Young@student.uib.no
underestimated, for if we accept (as I believe we are compelled to) that the total set of
relations that an object shares with the world to be constantly changing, then the
project of forming a static account of metaphysical identity that persists through time
is severely compromised. Yet, if we can finally manage to part ways with our platonic
heritage, and allow what changes to also be considered as real, we may find that many
classic and modern philosophical problems concerning identity lose their significance.
I will begin this paper by considering how a traditional ontological distinction,
that between essence and accident, has hindered the development of ontological
forms of holism. I will then present a criticism of the notion of nonrelational
properties that are the cornerstone of theories of essentialism in two parts:
Firstly, I will consider how the criticisms leveled by Kit Fine toward
conceptions of essentialism within modal logic work not only to elucidate the
inability of modal logic to account for essential properties but also work to
arouse suspicion surrounding the possibility of nonrelational properties. I will
claim that Fine’s criticisms, together with concerns surrounding Hempel’s
paradox, expose an incoherence in the notion that it is possible to provide a
satisfactory account of certain properties in abstraction from their place within a
wider context.
Secondly, we will shift our attention to essentialism in natural kinds and
consider the notion that relevance plays in metaphysical accounts of identity, by
examining Peter Geach’s notion of relative identity. I will argue that the
intensional relation between subject and object must be included in a
satisfactory account of metaphysical identity.
It is my view that these two relations: that between a property and the
environment in which it exists, and that between a subject and an object must be
included in any satisfactory account of metaphysical identity. Such an inclusion
would severely compromise the notion of nonrelational properties, thereby
challenging the plausibility of the doctrine of essentialism.
1 Ontological Holism in Analytic Philosophy
In Holism and Analytic Philosophy, Micheal Esfeld argues that a satisfactory
conception of holism “should construe holism in the first place as an ontological
claim” (Esfeld 1998), a demand that is voiced with increasing insistence by those
who wish to foster increased cooperation between philosophy and certain areas of
modern science. That such a demand should have to be made is in itself puzzling, for
very few areas of philosophy have experienced such a focus on holistic ideas as
analytic philosophy, in which we have seen epistemological and semantic holism
espoused in a number of seminal works. However, it is often overlooked that theses
“such as the Duhem-Quine thesis or coherentism, can be construed as ontological
claims too: they are claims about necessary conditions under which certain entities
have certain properties.”2 To hold that such holistic claims can apply only to
language or to knowledge is to subscribe to a certain conception of the way in which
2 Ibid, p. 366
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language and the world are related: a conception which isolates scheme and content
from one another. However, if we are to accept Sellar’s slogan that “all awareness is
a linguistic affair” and side with philosophers like Rorty and Davidson3 who have
worked to transcend such traditional philosophical distinctions as that between
scheme and content, we find that epistemological and semantic holism are not
content to find application only within the boundaries of knowledge and language
but demand application also within ontology.
So, why is it so difficult to find an analog to the epistemological and semantic
holism that applies to ontology within the annals of analytic philosophy? I believe
that the lack of interest can be explained by reference to the popularity of a certain
traditional distinction involved in the analysis of metaphysical identity that we have
inherited from the philosophy of early Greece. The distinction between essence and
accident forms a cornerstone of metaphysics because it concerns the identity of
objects in the world. Quine summarized the essentialist doctrine as “the doctrine that
some of the attributes of a thing (quite independently of the language in which the
thing is referred to, if at all) may be essential to the thing and others accidental. E.g.,
a man, or talking animal, or featherless biped (for they are all the same thing) is
essentially rational and accidentally two legged and talkative, not merely qua man
but qua itself” (Quine 1966). Despite the controversy surrounding his claim that this
is the Aristotelian form of the doctrine, it is sufficient for our purposes. Its
importance in the history of philosophy has led to two major endeavors that have
attempted to clarify and systematize these concepts.
Firstly, essence has been compared to a definition. It was assumed that the
method of specifying the identity of a word could also be applied to objects in
terms of identifying which properties were essential and which were accidental.
This method, while popular throughout the history of philosophy, has largely
fallen into disrepute in modern analytic philosophy, possibly due to the
difficulties created by Quine’s semantic holism thesis which denied the
possibility of isolating propositions from the language in which they are stated
while still retaining their meaning.
Secondly, essence has been translated into modal terms in which essence is
equated with necessity. We can say therefore that an object “de re” necessarily
possesses a quality which can be interpreted as the claim that the possession of
the property in question is essential to the identity of that object. This method
was a “late bloomer” and did not find concise explication in the works of
ancient Greek philosophers, but has however received increasing attention
throughout the history of philosophy consistently up to the present day, and now
represents the most acceptable framework within philosophy that a discussion of
essential properties can take place.
So, why does a distinction between essence and accident hinder the formation of a
thesis of ontological holism? Because to claim that a certain section of the totality of
properties an entity possesses4 constitutes the identity of that entity is also to claim
3 For an account of holism in Davidson’s work, see (Malpas 1992)
4 The essentialist claim is not restricted to properties and has been formulated recently concerning a
number of features, such as functions, dispositions, and causal powers.
Relevance and Relationalism 21
that it is possible to abstract that entity from some part of its particular temporal and
physical environment while still retaining its identity,5 which is precisely what is
prohibited by holistic theories. We can see clearly the incongruence that exists
between the relationality thesis and essentialism in their attempts to explicate
identity; relationalism insists that everything confers identity to an object, while
essentialism insists with just as much vigor that identity conferring relations or
properties must be restricted.6 The essentialist claim should ring familiar as a form of
reductionism, for it is no coincidence that the essential accidental distinction was
among the doctrines selected from the peripatetic tradition for canonization by
seventeenth century corpuscularians. The intuition that what changes could not be
real was further reinforced by what Ken Wilbur has called the “principle of
measurement” in which during the seventeenth century, the analysis of nature shifted
from Aristotelian classification to measurement, leading to a widespread intuition
that what could not be quantified was existentially inferior (Wilber 1977).
2 Essentialism and Modal Logic
In the twentieth century, Saul Kripke developed a system of modal logic in which
debates concerning essentialism were revived. After Quine, it became common to
claim that “It is built into our very understanding of de re metaphysical necessity that
certain descriptions, as opposed to others will be regarded as revealing the essence of
the object” (Fine 2005). In Essence and Modality, Kit Fine argues against the
assimilation of the notion of essence to metaphysical necessity. These criticisms
form part of a greater philosophical project for Fine, in which he encourages a return
to definitional accounts of essence. Fine notes an asymmetry to exist between
notions of necessary and essential attributes, claiming that all essential properties are
necessary properties, but not all necessary properties are essential properties.
Necessary properties are therefore only sufficient and not necessary for the status of
essential properties and therefore should not be regarded as synonymous.
Conducting an analysis of the metaphysics of identity as part of a wider application
of modality de re in applied logic thus is fundamentally flawed, because such a
system cannot make the distinction between necessary properties and those
necessary for an essentialist ontology.
The relevance of such a claim to a relationalist ontology is revealed with the help
of an example. It is necessary to an apple in New Zealand that it be distinct from a
5 In the Aristotelian form of essentialism, the claim involves a particular kind of abstraction. In the
Metaphysics, Aristotle does not claim that primary being (essence) can exist separately from the universals
that characterize them, and criticizes Plato for supporting such a claim. He does, however, claim that the
particular combination of accidental properties an entity possesses do nothing to confer ontological
identity. This is the kind of abstraction that is criticized in this paper: an abstraction of identity and not
existence.
6 It is important to note that essential properties must have a complement; that is, the notion of essential
properties is a distinction that must be drawn among properties, to segregate some from others. If we take
all the properties of an object to be essential, the essentialism thesis collapses into the relationality thesis
outlined above. Vasilis Politis states “For if a thing has as many essences as it has properties, then we can
forget about the concept of essence altogether, and we need only retain the general concept of a property”
(Politis 2004).
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coffee cup which is sitting on a table in a small café in Egypt. But it is not essential
to the apple that it be distinct from the cup, for as Fine claims, there is nothing in the
apples nature that connects it in any way with the cup (Fine 1994). Fine regards this
as showing the inadequacies of modal logic in coping with the essentialist doctrine,
in a moment of sarcastic eloquence he states “oh happy metaphysician! For in
discovering the nature of but one thing, he thereby discovers the nature of all
things.”7
This idea should strike the reader as familiar, for in failing to restrict the
attribution of essential properties in a way which corresponds to our intuitive notion
of essence, it succeeds in articulating the relationality thesis. Fine regards the above
example as illuminating the inability of modal logic to account for essentialism. I
want to suggest instead that the incoherence of the essentialist doctrine is exposed in
its translation into modal terms. And that the burden of proof lies with essentialism
in demonstrating its value as a necessary ontological thesis.
And why not? That the identity of the apple is related to the identity of the cup in
some way is a claim that has found limited articulation in philosophy despite its
status as heresy within the western philosophical tradition and counterintuitive
nature. We find this idea for example in Hegel’s Science of Logic in which he claims
that “a finite being is one that relates itself to something else; it is a content which
necessarily stands in relation to other content, to the whole world” (Hegel 1989).
Here, Hegel argues that an object of thought that is anything less than the totality of
existence is finite and is actively limited by anything which falls outside the
boundaries of its being. Applied to the above example, we could say that the cup
plays a role in limiting the identity of the apple and stands therefore in a necessary
relation to it.
It was in response to such ideas that G.E. Moore formulated his famous
criticism of the doctrine of internal relations early in the twentieth century.
Moore translated essentialism into informal modal terms—“x might have existed
without a certain property,” and thereby missed the subtleties concerning identity
and existence. The consequences such a claim holds hang entirely upon our
understanding of how x is claimed to exist in the absence of certain attributes. For
if we allow (as I think we must) that x would exist differently due to the absence or
acquisition of properties—that without fathering George V, Edward VII would
have been different—then the affirmation of such a claim does not support an
essentialist doctrine.
I am therefore supporting a far stronger thesis of relationalism than that which
Moore set out to refute in his seminal paper “Internal and External Relations.”
Moore’s argument highlights what he takes to be the central claim of the doctrine of
internal relations—that all relations modify the terms involved. Yet, his analysis of
this doctrine functions by reducing entities into terms and relations, thereby
betraying its own essentialist foundations and begging the question. For in asking,
whether or not a relation modifies its terms is to have already subscribed to a
particular metaphysical account of the identity of objects, one which allows for the
discussion of entities in isolation from their environment. A similar argument has
been employed by Hubert Dreyfus to demonstrate the incoherence of Satosi
7 Ibid.
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Watanabe’s notion of quantifying value in artificial intelligence projects.8 The
problem with both Moore and Watanabe’s approach is that relations and values are
taken to represent determinations which can be added or subtracted from already
existent objects. The idea that such determinations somehow play no role in the
determination of these objects is what the thesis of relationalism brings into
question, and following Hubert Dreyfus, I will argue that the solution can only be
provided by modifying the way in which we pose the question. Changing
vocabulary is sometimes necessary to make progress with old problems; Rorty, for
example, writes that “Interesting philosophy is rarely an examination of the pros and
cons of a thesis. Usually it is, implicitly or explicitly, a contest between an
entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a half formed new
vocabulary which vaguely promises great things” (Rorty 1989).
The difference between essential properties and necessary properties has been
noticed before, by the two philosophers jointly responsible for the doctrine of
essence—Plato and Aristotle. In Plato’s Euthyphro for example, it is claimed that
things that are good are necessarily desired by the gods, and things that are
necessarily desired by the gods are good, yet the essence of such objects is that they
are good and not that they are desired by gods. Plato held that “a two way necessary
relation between things is compatible with a one way essential relation between
them” (Politis 2004).
The problem for modal logic in articulating the essentialist doctrine can be
summarized briefly by stating that an essential property is nonrelational and that
necessary properties can be relational. It seems that for any object, we could generate
a large number of trivial and arbitrary necessary truths that involve relations. The
number of arbitrary necessary truths that it is possible to generate for one object is
limited only by the number of beings and properties that we allow to populate our
ontological universe.
This problem runs deep; not only does it show that necessity and essence are not
extensionally equivalent, it also shows us that in a sense, all properties can be
considered relational. We understand accidental properties to be relative—the
greenness of grass is a property which is claimed to depend on the constitution of
a perceiving subject and the chemical constitution of the object. But even if we take
a property that is commonly held to be both essential and necessary such as the
atomic number of hydrogen, we could supply negative claims of necessity such as
“it is necessary that hydrogen does not have the atomic number of 2” to counter the
positive claim that “it is necessary that hydrogen has the atomic number of 1.” We
could combine such negative identity claims to provide one that is logically
equivalent to the single positive claim. Such a claim would appear as “All atomic
elements that do not have the atomic number of 1 are not hydrogen.” Karl Hempel
used such a claim to provide the foundations for an instantial theory of inductive
method that many have found to hold counterintuitive consequences. The
“equivalence principle” states that “If e is confirming evidence for hypothesis 1,
and hypothesis 1 is logically equivalent to hypothesis 2, then e is confirming
8 “Although talk of values is rather new in philosophy, it represents a final stage of objectification in which the
pragmatic considerations which pervade experience and determine what counts as an object are conceived of as
just further characteristics of independent objects, such as hardness and color” (Dreyfus 1972).
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evidence for hypothesis 2” (Sosa and Dancy 1993). According to this principle, a
yellow banana provides evidence for the claim that all eggplants are purple. This
theory has been subject to heavy criticism, most notably over the limited structure of
claims that appear within it (all As are Bs) and concerning the issue of observation.
However, such a theory does bring the notion of nonrelational properties into
question. For if our investigations into the identity of an object depend to some
extent on evidence instantiated in other objects, must we not allow that identity itself
is relational? Without the existence of a plethora of different atomic elements, each
with different atomic numbers, hydrogen could not be said to possess a property of
having a single proton. And this is not because perceiving subjects could not notice
such a property, but because as Hegel claimed, a property is constituted by its
differentiation from a totality. A property that everything possesses and nothing can
lose does not seem like a property at all; following Kant, we could claim that
“existence is not a predicate.” This casts doubt on the possibility of considering
properties in isolation and encourages us to understand all properties as relying on
relations to other properties for their determination.
But there is another problem with the instantial model of induction that Hempel
advocated, and one that bears uncanny similarity to Fine’s criticism of equating
essence to necessity. For a yellow banana not only provides evidence that all
eggplants are purple, but also that all eggplants are white. It seems that this model of
induction allows an instance of anything to stand as evidence for a claim of nearly
anything. Hempel’s inductive method faces the same problem that modal logic faces
with the essentialist doctrine; both seem unable to restrict their results in a way that
corresponds to our intuitions. The notion of background information that we use to
restrict our inductive investigations has been proposed as a solution for Hempel’s
instantial theory; it is this information that determines the relevance of evidential
instances to a particular hypotheses. Reflecting on the difficulties modal logic faces
in articulating essentialism, Kit Fine also notes that what is required is a condition of
relevance, but notes that such an addition would provide no solution because “it is
hard to see how the required notion of relevance could be understood without
already presupposing the concept of essence in question,” concluding that “there is
nothing in the ‘logic’ of essence to justify an asymmetric judgment of relevance”
(Fine 1994).
The notion of relevance occupies a crucial position in theories of identity, and can
be construed in different ways. Undoubtedly, Fine regards relevance in the above
passages as pertaining to a notion of absolute identity such that would occur within a
realist ontology. For example, within Locke’s framework of primary and secondary
qualities, we could anticipate a claim that quantifiable properties such as length are
more relevant to the identity of an object than sensible properties such as color.
It seems that the notion of relevance bears more than a striking similarity to the
notion of essence. Only a proportion of properties can be relevant to the identity of
an entity, if we take all properties to be relevant the meaning of the notion collapses.
Indeed, properties we take to be essential are therefore relevant, and properties are
relevant because they are essential. Relevance in the sense that Fine applies the term
is therefore extensionally equivalent to essence.
The notion of relevance has also proved to be the stumbling block for classical
artificial intelligence projects founded upon propositional representations of the
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external world. The intractability of the “frame problem” highlights how the failure
to add structures of relevance to already formed symbolic maps of the world in the
effort to facilitate pattern recognition represents a theoretical problem and not merely
a limit posed by the current state of technology. Dreyfus draws attention to the fact
that for a program to recognize something as an eye, it must have already recognized
the context as a face, and that “if each context can be recognized only in terms of
features selected as relevant and interpreted in terms of a broader context, the AI
worker is faced with a regress of contexts” Dreyfus (1972). The “frame problem”
displays how relevance cannot be formalized and, in doing so, highlights the thesis
of this paper—that relevance permeates our world at a fundamental level and
therefore resists abstraction.
Relevance can be construed in a number of different ways depending on the goals
that we employ in seeking to classify an object. It is relevance that forms a bond
between subjects and objects, a relation that I will argue no satisfactory account of
identity can do without. It is this idea that I will explore in the next section, marking
our departure from Kit Fine and turning our attention toward the notion of natural
and artificial kinds.
3 Relevance and Relativity in the Metaphysics of Identity
Imagine a man whose job is to wade through garbage heaps and group together
objects that weighed over 50 g and objects that weighed under 50 g. Like any
normal garbage heap, there exists a huge variety of objects, from cans to empty
potato chip bags, and consequently, each group of objects comes to include objects
of different materials, weights, and volumes. Eventually, for ease of communication
when explaining to his employer which pile was which, both came to refer to the
two classes of objects as the “over 50s” and the “under 50s,” respectively.
Following the tradition of distinguishing between primary and secondary
qualities, we could claim that the weight of objects is the primary quality of these
two classes of objects, and is not related to us in any way. We could claim that this is
an unproblematic example of a nonrelational property (or a self-relational property
as Aristotle asserted as fundamental to his conception of essence); the weight of the
objects would have been the same regardless of whether they had been weighed and
classified. Although I believe that modern physics has presented serious challenges
to the notion of primary properties,9 I am going to allow for the sake of argument
that such properties could exist, in order to illustrate that the relationships between
subject and object must be included in any satisfactory account of metaphysical
identity.
So, when questioned about the identity of the two classes of objects, the man may
be inclined to say that “possessing a weight greater than 50 g” is an essential quality
for the over 50s, whereas the material of which each object is constituted (plastic,
metal, etc.) is merely an accidental property.
9 While the incompatibility of Quantum Mechanics and Relativity theory bewilders those who work
towards a grand unification, the challenge that these two theories pose to the present discussion is
curiously similar: how can we include frames of reference in our descriptions of an independent world?
26 M. Young
What are we then to say about the class of “under 50s”? Does it represent a
natural or an artificial kind? The criterion of identity for this class of objects is
weight, a measurable quality commonly taken to be nonrelational. However, the act
of classification itself is related to the owner of the garbage heap, and his desire to
implement a certain system. His selection of certain properties, and not others,
reflects our intuition that in this case, identity is theory-relative.
The intuitive response here I think is that “under 50s” is an artificial kind, because the
existence of this class depends on the goal-directed activity of people, even though the
property, which determines class membership, can be assumed not to depend on human
interaction. Yet, adopting this view creates problems for the notion of natural kinds. For
classification itself is a goal-directed activity and involves the adoption of a particular
intensional stance toward an object. It is the intensional stance, necessary to all acts of
classification that form a relationship between observer and object, and renders the
notion of nonrelational properties extremely problematic.
Now, it could be replied that obviously, all objects in the world stand in certain
relations, and that the properties of objects also stand in relations to observers. Yet,
concerning the weight of an object, the intensional relationship that this property
forms with observers constitutes nothing of the character of the property. We could
say that our perceptual relation with the weight of an object is accidental. But by
shifting the division of relations into accidental and essential from the level of object
to properties provides no remedy to the problems inherent in an empiricist account
of essence, for we cannot help but become embroiled in an infinite regress of
divisions, shifting deeper into experience but never grasping that which we seek.
One might wonder how a nonrelational property could become a criterion for an
essentialist definition of identity within empiricism in the first place. A strictly
empiricist conception of identity prohibits in its methodology alone the existence of
true nonrelational properties, because any property always stands in some relation to
observers. We could say that true nonrelational properties died when Robert Boyle
espoused the empirical restraint which would become a cornerstone of the scientific
revolution—that “the essence of a thing must be selected from among its sensible
attributes” (Kultgen 1956). In effect, what Boyle demanded was that we select
nonrelational properties from relational properties, and we need not be established
logicians to appreciate the futility of this notion.
That all acts of classification must occur within some intensional framework is an
idea that has found expression in both the continental and analytic tradition during the
twentieth century; Kant’s notion of apperception and Heidegger’s claim that “The ‘as’
makes up the structure of the explicitness of something which is understood”
(Heidegger 1962) complement the same notion expressed in Rorty’s denial of the
existence of a “skyhook.” The increased popularity of such arguments in modern
philosophy explains the disappearance of claims of “presuppositionless” methods in
both continental and analytic philosophy. And neither can we claim that the nature of
the goals which direct our enquiry can help us to demarcate the difference between
natural and artificial kinds, for as both Rorty and Heidegger claim that there is no
“natural” frame of enquiry or set of goals with which we could support such a claim.
To see the way in which classification is an active goal-directed enterprise, let us
consider water. Perhaps due to Putnam’s “twin earth” thought experiment which he
wielded in defense of natural kind essentialism, water is often thought to be a good
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candidate for natural kinds in philosophical debates concerning essentialism.
However, water is far more complex than some would like to allow. Water (H2O)
and heavy water (D2O) represent water molecules containing two different isotopes of
hydrogen. Isotopes of an element all contain the same number if protons and electrons,
yet differ in the number of neutrons and also therefore atomic mass. Concerning
properties, however, water and heavy water are the same molecule in terms of
solubility, but different in terms of boiling points (where atomic weight is the relevant
factor). Such cases suggest that what counts as an intrinsic or primary quality of an
object depends upon exactly what behavior we are seeking to investigate.10 Yet, the
notion of relevance to our interests holds no place within a doctrine of essences, which
seeks to insulate part of reality from the effects of observers.
The notion of natural kinds finds articulation within a framework that separates
subject from object. It assumes the possibility of passively receiving information
about the world with which we can establish claims about the nature of an object
which is not related to our classificatory actions. It is therefore understood that
activity on the part of the subject compromises our claims to objective knowledge,
because such knowledge is defined precisely by its independence from all perceiving
subjects. We find ourselves then in a curious situation: seeking to actively
characterize the nature of external reality while remaining as passive as possible
throughout the process.11 The full significance of this problem is revealed in
historical accounts of the development of quantum mechanics. In investigating the
behavior of subatomic particles, physicists in the early part of the twentieth century
encountered a problem that exposed a fundamental flaw in the notion of an
“external” world. Put simply, the smallest possible instrument (a photon) with which
we could use to gather information of certain subatomic particles would disturb them
in such a way as to make it impossible to collect the data. The act of measurement
could no longer be perceived as a passive reception of information, the instrument
no longer understood to be a mere extension of our sensory capacities, even the
boundaries between subject and object were called into question. Ken Wilbur states
that “objective measurement and verification could no longer be the mark of
absolute reality, because the measured object could never be completely separated
from the measuring subject—the measured and the measurer, the verified and the
verifier, at this level are one and the same” (Wilber 1977).
The contradictory element underlying our claim that it is possible to gain
knowledge of an “external” reality is implicit in Carnap’s Empiricism, Semantics and
Ontology in which he asserts that our claims to knowledge are only meaningful if
posed within a certain linguistic framework. Carnap claims that “To be real in the
scientific sense means to be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be
meaningfully applied to the system itself” (Carnap 1966). Claims to knowledge of a
world independent of us are analogous to such external questions, and not only are
they meaningless, but also downright contradictory.
10 The decision concerning whether or not to regard isotopes as elements was subject to much debate
within the scientific community. Despite the ruling that isotopes are to be considered as forms of the
elements of which they share the same number of protons, the controversy continues to this day.
11 Hegel noted this peculiarity in Phenomenology of Spirit forming from it a point of criticism of the form
of consciousness of sense perception—“In apprehending it, we must refrain from trying to comprehend it”
Krasnoff (2008).
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The relation between objects and the classificatory activity of subjects was
formalized in the work of English philosopher and logician Peter Geach, who
advocated a logic of identity that rejected the notion of absolute identity. It is
interesting to note that Geach shares his motivation in proposing such an account
with centuries of scholastic philosophy before him, to explain the paradoxical nature
of identity in the holy trinity. Such a concern led Geach to propose that the claim that
“x is identical with y” is “an incomplete expression; it is short for ‘x is the same A as
y’ where ‘A’ represents some count noun understood from the context of utterance”
(Geach 1967). Geach argues that our ontology is related in a fundamental way to our
ideology, and an identity theory based on either identity predicates or quantification
must allow for this relativism. Geach is concerned to show that different theories
construe identity in different ways according to the particular kinds of predicates
they employ, and that we risk Meinongian exponential growth of our ontology if we
continue to voice a commitment to a notion of absolute identity. Quine’s solution of
an interpretation of quantifiers that yields absolute identity by preserving truth
conditions between the same proposition interpreted in different theories is admitted
by Geach to work, but is rejected on the grounds that it does not grant our ideologies
the appropriate flexibility without drastically altering our ontology. By relinquishing
the notion of absolute identity, Geach argues, we create distance between ontology
and ideology, granting the latter the flexibility we require it to have. In considering
the overgrown jungle that our ontology could become, Geach remarks “We surely
need Ockhams razor to cut through this tangle; and it is not too hard to see where to
make the cut. We reject absolute identity, but admit as many as we need of two place
predicables of the form ‘- is the same A as -’ where ‘A’ is some count noun.”12 Such
an argument claims that the relation between theory and identity is not to be ignored,
and if we understand theory in terms of human activity as Rorty would suggest,13 the
notion of a world that is truly independent of us is no longer feasible.
I believe the notion of nonrelational properties which underlies the essentialist
doctrine to be an anachronism, a remnant of an outdated system of thought that has
somehow remained unnoticed like a stowaway in the bowels of a ship. Within a
teleological cosmology, a notion of identity that is truly independent of us and its
environment is unproblematic, because it has been bestowed upon objects in terms
of form and purpose. As far as I know, there are no philosophical debates concerning
the “true” identity of can openers and television sets. Asking for “absolute identity”
in a secular framework is tantamount to posing a teleological question from outside
Carnap’s teleological framework.
But should we sympathize with Aristotle, in regarding the notion of natural kinds
to possess not only explanatory value but utility too?14
12 Ibid p. 10
13 Rorty puts it succinctly in claiming that “we should think of language not as naming a thing with an
intrinsic nature of its own, but as a way of abbreviating the kinds of complicated interactions with the rest
of the universe that are unique to the higher anthropods.” From (Rorty 1999)
14 Aristotle seemed to contradict himself on this point, for he argued that essentialism is necessary for
thought and language to function, but at the same time maintained that episteme (the mode of explanatory
knowledge of which natural kinds belong) is characterized as knowledge for the sake of leisurely
contemplation. Goal directed activity belongs more to techne, which was held by Aristotle to be inferior to
episteme.
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We can respond to this objection simply by stating that we can be certain about some
things, that the next hydrogen atom will have only one proton, or that the carton of milk
in my fridge will not change overnight into an eggplant for example, without that
certainty featuring in our ontology as an entity of a particular kind. If we trade certainty
for essence, we remove one more obstruction to a plausible account of ontological
holism. Such an account must recognize the two forms of relations discussed above as
fundamental in its conception of ontological identity, that between objects and objects,
and that between objects and subjects. For in doing so, we pave the way for a thesis of
relationalism in which we recognize that “there are relations all the way down, all the
way up, and all the way out in every direction; you never reach something which is not
just one more nexus of relations” (Rorty 1999).
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